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1. Introduction
1 The influence of Richard Rorty has not faded since his demise more than a decade ago.
Some of his works have been published posthumously (Rorty 2010; Rorty 2016), others
have been republished in valuable collections (Voparil & Bernstein 2010; Rorty 2014)
and some of his unpublished work has already appeared too (Małecki & Voparil 2020).1
Important international symposia have been held around the world (see e.g. Penelas &
Voparil 2014)2 and the Richard Rorty Society (RSS) was founded in 2014 “to promote
study of the work and life of Richard Rorty (1931-2007), and to encourage and support
scholarship and other writing inspired by and in the spirit  of  his  work,  across  the
disciplines.”3 Last but not least,  in addition to volume XXXII of The Library of  Living
Philosophers (Auxier & Hahn 2010), a whole host of new monographs and anthologies
provide analyses, interpretations and, to varying degrees, syntheses of Rorty’s oeuvre
and legacy.4 In this context,  the recent monograph by Rosa Maria Calcaterra (2019)
represents, in my view, a serious effort in the search of a new pragmatist anthropology.
2 Rorty’s vision of philosophy differs entirely from the traditional one. Critical of the past
it seeks new and original ways of breathing life and interest back into philosophy. In
many respects his intentions and efforts were so radical that they were most often
misunderstood at best or misrepresented at worst. Understanding him correctly is one
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of the tasks that still lies ahead of us Rortyans. In its own way Calcaterra’s book serves
this mission. In her efforts to shed greater clarity on the whole Rortyan philosophical
mission she has picked out the key points of his project, such as the linguistic turn, new
pragmatism,  anti-representationalism,  anti-foundationalism,  anti-authoritarianism
and  anti-dualism  in  understanding  relations  between  nature  and  culture.
Comprehending what Rorty was attempting to achieve in philosophy is by no means an
easy task.  For instance,  how can one put together his pluralistic,  yet holistic  style?
Rorty’s philosophy still needs explication and Calcaterra’s book graciously fulfils this
task in various ways. 
 
2. Moderate Rortyism 
3 Calcaterra’s approach to Rorty is balanced and moderate rather than radical.  She is
cautious not to draw any ill-considered conclusions from his challenges. This is clear
throughout her work in her attempts at blending pragmatism with analytic philosophy
(or  logical  positivism),5 which  is  what  her  general  strategy  is  aimed  at.  When  she
ascribes this strategy to Rorty, arguing for a permanent Carnapian instalment in his
anti-metaphysical  (and  for  that  matter  anti-foundationalist  and  anti-
representationalist)  orientation,  she  makes  explicit  an  aspect  of  Rorty  that has
somehow remained hidden.6 According to Calcaterra, Rorty had learned not only the
limits  of  analytic  philosophy and the  need to  transcend them,  but  also  the  crucial
metaphilosophical lesson he subsequently built on by making linguistic practices the
centre  of  his  philosophizing.  She  describes  this  development  in  more  detail  when
directing our attention to the fact that Russell and Wittgenstein as well as Ayer and
Ryle,  and indeed Carnap – going as far  back as the 1930s –  had revealed that “the
problems  of  philosophy  are  problems  of  language”’  and  hence  the  need  for  the
“linguistic turn.” Simply put, the lesson was that we should start analysing language as
a means of distinguishing philosophical pseudo-problems from meaningful ones. 
4 Nonetheless, being a linguistic philosopher and being an analytic philosopher, and not
of the Russell-Ayer-Carnap-Quine line but the early Wittgenstein-Ryle-Sellars-Davidson
one, is not the same thing. It all depends on how we understand language. Thus Rorty
not  only  distinguished  between  analytic  and linguistic  philosophy,  but  remained  a
linguistic  philosopher  who  turned  pragmatist  along  the  James-Dewey-later
Wittgenstein-Heidegger and Gadamer line, having understood that the crucial thing is
how we understand language. And Chapter 1 of Calcaterra’s work provides us with a
proper account of the Rortyan route from “analytic philosophy to pragmatism and vice
versa.”7 
5 Another example of Calcaterra’s remarkable, non-radical Rortyan integrative approach
is that she accepts Peirce (unlike Rorty) and tries to find a way of accommodating both,
rather than juxtaposing them, as is traditional.  She is able to defend Peirce against
Rorty’s claim that he is “the most Kantian of thinkers” because she sees that Peirce’s
project was headed beyond Kant. Her interpretation brings Peirce closer to Rorty than
the latter was himself aware most of the time, for instance by reminding us of analogies
between Peirce and Wittgenstein in Rorty’s early papers.  She also refers to Peirce’s
“logical socialism” as being close to Rorty’s understanding of the sociality of rationality
(Calcaterra  2019:  85-6).  Moreover,  in  Chapter 6  Calcaterra  conclusively  claims  that
there are analogies between Peirce’s tychism and Rorty’s contingentism. 
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3. Linguistic Pragmatism and its Discontents 
6 I am inclined to consider Chapter 2 on Rorty’s linguistic pragmatism the key chapter, as
in it  Calcaterra explains how misguided it  is  to  consider it  as  “linguistic  idealism.”
Human beings are natural linguistic beings and their linguistic practices are real social
practices, as real as any non-human natural entities incorporated into these practices.
Without linguistic practices there would be no human beings. They make us human.
7 One type of linguistic practice to which Calcaterra pays considerable attention is the
practices  of  justification.  These  are  the  paradigmatic  social  practices  of  social
communication – Rortyan conversation – in which humans exchange their vocabularies
and create not only the space of reasons and arguments, but also the spaces of values,
meanings  and  ethical  intentions,  in  fact  the  whole  space  of  culture  in  which,  and
through which, they live their lives as real cultural beings. Calcaterra brings together
both the epistemic and ethical uses of language as a tool with application primarily in
interhuman  (intersubjective)  relations  rather  than  as  a  tool  of  representation  in
language-reality  relationships.  Humans  invented  language  to  convey  to  each  other
what they want to achieve – their intentions and aims – and what they will do vis-à-vis
non-human reality, but not for the purposes of telling the latter anything. “Reality does
not speak, only we, humans, do” is the Rortyan thesis for understanding language and
its  role  in  the  human  world  (see  Rorty  1989:  6).  Only  we  humans  have  thoughts,
intentions and vocabularies. Through the latter we express the former and describe all
we encounter – which we call “reality.” Creating the cultural space has nothing to do
with  linguistic  idealism.  “We simply  acknowledge  the  coextension  of  language  and
reality, recognizing it as a natural prerogative of humankind, shown and justified by
our cognitive and moral practices.” (Calcaterra 2019: 23). There is no real relation or
interaction between the human mind and the non-human world apart from and outside
human practices, both linguistic and non-linguistic. Our mind, or brain even, has no
relation to reality until we start acting as linguistic and physical beings, and in both
cases  as  social  beings.  Our  mind  or  brain  does  not  function  in  these  interactions/
practices as a mirror of reality; it functions as a tool which produces what are called
representations.  Calcaterra  knows  very  well  that  every  use  of  language  entails
interpretation and that this component “is not only present in classical pragmatism but
it  constitutes  a  decisive  part  of  it,”  although it  was  “used in  order  to  criticize  the
traditional ‘spectatorial’ or ‘correspondentist’ theories of knowledge and truth” (ibid.).
Calcaterra, and Rorty, explain that asking whether language has anything in common
with reality is  like the nonsensical  question of  whether “wrenches wrench.” Or,  by
analogy,  the question which Dewey was solving:  whether experience takes us  away
from nature or, conversely, makes us participate in it. The correct pragmatist response
to both questions would seem to be that both language and experience are real parts of
our  human  reality,  and  that  is  both  natural  as  well  as  sociocultural.  Through
experience and language we have creative and potentially multifaceted transactions
with originally non-human reality but also with the reality created by us humans. Here,
unfortunately, Rorty seems to be at least as radically against his main hero Dewey as he
was  against  Peirce.  Calcaterra  is  well  aware  of  this.  She  defends  Rorty’s  linguistic
pragmatism as a substantial contribution, but at the same time she indicates that it
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would  be  a  mistake  to  counterpose  it  with  Dewey’s  naturalistic  conception  of
experience. Language does not exist in separation from experience and vice versa. 
8 While Calcaterra concentrates on linguistic practices in her book, she is well aware that
they are not the whole of reality. Language is a real form of human behaviour, but
“cognitive and moral practices” and other human social practices are not exclusively
linguistic. They include non-linguistic empirical and causal components such as direct
non-verbal and non-discursive transactions with natural and social environments. Thus
we can think of “non-linguistic practices” in addition to linguistic ones. If we do this,
we should do so with the important caveat that distinguishing between something does
not  mean  dividing  it.8 In  reality,  both  linguistic  and  non-linguistic  practices  have
complex mutual transactions which have yet to be clarified.9 What seems clear is that
linguistic practices serve as tools in human non-linguistic transactions with reality –
and even more so, according to Dewey, as the “tool of tools.” In other words, to survive
effectively in the natural environment humans have developed language as their tool,
alongside other tools, for adapting and even transcending nature. It is no wonder that
human  linguistic  practices  produce  “idealistic”  things  in  relation  to  reality, i.e.
projects,  visions  or  utopias  expressed  in  language  that  motivate  and direct  human
actions.
9 Calcaterra indicates, though mostly “between the lines” rather than explicitly, that to
suppose  there  can  be  dualism  between  linguistic  and  non-linguistic  practices  is
hopeless.  She  invokes  the  works  of  Richard  Bernstein,  Joseph  Margolis,  Richard
Shusterman,  Thomas  Alexander  and  Colin  Koopman  to  indicate  that  humans  are
naturally  physical,  somatic  beings.  The  Rortyan  linguistic  opposition  to  Deweyan
experiential pragmatism must therefore be corrected. Linguistic practices are crucial
but they are not primary and nor are they self-sufficient.  In other words,  language
cannot eradicate or substitute experience, or vice versa. Culture cannot replace nature;
they  are  coextensive.  One  cannot  think  without  language,  but  non-linguistic
interaction with reality is possible. Thinking is not the only way we relate to reality
even  though  our  relations  obtain  a  qualitatively  different  level,  i.e.  a  distinctively
human  level,  through  language.  We  can  describe  anything  in  language  including
experience; nonetheless, this does not make the non-linguistic linguistic.
10 The “experience or language” dichotomy is false and unfortunate. Rorty was right to
stress  language,  but  not  at  the  expense  of  experience.  He  was  right  to  reject  the
Cartesian  notion  of  experience,  but  not  the  Deweyan  one.  To  support  Dewey  here
rather than Rorty does not mean supporting naturalistic metaphysics, which Rorty was
opposed  to.  Language  does  not  function  when  separated  from  experience,  and
experience  does  not  function when separated from language.  Human experience  is
linguistic, and human language entails experience. But this alliance between language
and experience is pragmatist rather than analytic philosophical in conception. If this
reading is correct, then to the extent that Rorty abandoned the concept of experience
altogether, he has not, interestingly enough, moved beyond the analytic movement,
mostly because he followed Davidson, according to Calcaterra (2019: 25). This reveals
that his “linguistic pragmatism” is more Davidsonian than Deweyan, which is not the
same.
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4. Normativity and Pan-Linguisticism
11 Rorty’s philosophy of normativity is based on the idea of the anti-absolutism of norms.
Normativity is socially created by humans; it is neither a natural kind nor a natural law.
Here human is posited against nonhuman. So how can it be trustworthy if it is created
by  humans  and  is  revisable?  This  is  the  issue  because  humans  seem  to  have
traditionally trusted some things that are immutable, stable, non-changeable, universal
and  steady  if  not  eternal,  ahistorical.  But  if  the  norms  that  humans  devise  for
themselves are contingent, i.e. social, historical and dependable on human practices,
then we encounter a problem here. The Rortyan solution to it, presented and advocated
by Calcaterra, is not to be metaphysical. The criteria for devising and judging whether
our social norms are “good” do not come from “above” or from a non-human authority.
These criteria, like the norms themselves, come from our social practices and social
values such as solidarity, empathy, hope, freedom, creativity and communication. That
is, in sum, from humanism understood as “everything that encourages humanity, faith
in  our  powers,  human  flourishing,  and  self-reliance  rather  than  mistrust”  and
“everything that eliminates the evil inflicted on humans by humans” (Višňovský 2020:
16).  But  again,  Calcaterra  (2019:  38-9)  rightly  shows  that  Dewey’s  “naturalistic
humanism”  and  Rorty’s  “deep  humanism”  differ  because  the  latter  insists  on  the
“instrumental power of vocabularies,” which she thinks is “very questionable” (ibid.:
42). She goes on to “blame Rorty for having neglected the point that language itself is a
part  of  experience,”  even  though  this  “is  not  to  contradict  Rorty’s  rejection  of
foundationalist metaphysics” (ibid.: 43). 
12 At this point Calcaterra agrees with Rorty that there is a causal link between language
and reality,  and Rorty of course agreed with Davidson on there being a causal  link
between beliefs and reality (ibid.: 44-6). This, again, as I see it, raises the tricky problem
of  the  relations  between  linguistic  practices,  which  function  as  vehicles  of  human
cognitive beliefs as well as moral beliefs, and non-linguistic elements of reality. To my
mind, it requires more detailed elaboration. If we ask questions like “Why do we think
what  we  think?,”  or  “Why  do  we  speak  as  we  speak?,”  the  causal  reply  would  be
“Because reality determines that we think/speak as we do.” However, in Rorty’s case
this is problematic since according to his conception of linguistic practice the reply
should be: “Because our peers as linguistic agents make/persuade us to think/speak as
we  do.”  In  other  words,  through  social  communication,  the  linguistic  practice  of
members of our community influence other language users to think or speak as they
do,  and  this  relationship  is  based  on  understanding  the  meanings  and  norms  of
linguistic practices rather than on the causal operation of non-linguistic entities. Fully-
fledged pragmatism is not a kind of pan-linguisticism, not even the Rortyan one. For it
to  be  one,  it  would  have  to  include  a  better  understanding  of  relations  between
linguistic and non-linguistic transactions than anyone has developed so far. In fact, the
label “linguistic pragmatism” is one-sided and insufficient owing to the singular focus
on linguistic practices in abstraction from non-linguistic ones, as if the latter did not
exist. But they do exist and they pose a problem regarding their relations, causal or
otherwise, to linguistic practices. 
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5. The Concept of Human
13 Finally,  at  the  centre  of  Calcaterra’s  work  is  Rorty’s  key  philosophical  issue:
understanding humans.  Who are  we humans?  According to  Rorty  there  is  no  non-
human or supra-human authority that can answer this question for us; we humans are
the only ones who care both about the question and the answer. According to Rorty’s
ethnocentrism, we are naturally cultural beings who cannot escape our culture as it is
the creation of our community. We cannot escape our community nor its forms of life,
including social practices, both linguistic and non-linguistic. Being cultural beings does
not exclude us from among the creatures of nature, that is, the biological, physical,
somatic beings who engage in transactions with the natural environment, as Dewey
and other classical pragmatists have underscored. There is no culture without nature
and  nor  is  there  culture  without  language.  Both  culture  and  language  have
transformative powers. Our human history is, indisputably, the history of “influential
metaphors”  or  “linguistic  history”  (Calcaterra  2019:  9,  84,  92,  103).  Changing
vocabularies,  inventing  new  ways  of  speaking,  transforming  linguistic and
communicative practices obviously all lead to changes in behaviour not just in beliefs
and mindsets.  Rorty put  his  trust  most  of  all  in  creativity  of  all  kinds of  linguistic
practices and his social hope was “finding better versions of ourselves” (ibid.: 66). This
was another reason why he valued imagination over knowledge as representation. He
did  not  think  our  genuine  human  task  lay  in  copying  reality,  obeying  non-human
authorities,  looking  for  ahistorical  (metaphysical)  necessities  and  obtaining  them;
rather, because we are self-creative and self-interpretive beings, we should, and indeed
could, do nothing more than produce better self-descriptions that might lead us to a
better human future. In other words, we are creative subjects mutually responsible to
ourselves. We “should find a way to free ourselves from the picture of the human being
as responsible to something ‘non-human,’ including the notion of ‘Objective Reality’
that governs foundational epistemology and constantly traps our theoretical efforts”
(ibid.: 116). 
14 Calcaterra adeptly portrays (and supports) this Rortyan notion of human subjectivity as
anti-essentialist  (anti-Cartesian  and  anti-Kantian),  that  is,  inter-subjective,  social,
historical,  relational,  pluralistic  and  contingent.  She  ably  combines  its  narrative
character with Humean naturalism while still reproaching Rorty for “overlooking the
biological level of such a narrative model” and “focusing on the social-ethical side”
(ibid.: 89-91). Such a conception would be unthinkable without the cultural mission of
philosophy  itself,  consisting  not  only  in  cultural  criticism  but  in  its  edifying  and
therapeutic functions. Calcaterra writes, “Philosophy is, to his [Rorty’s] eyes, more an
art  than  a  scientific  discipline:  a  cultural  expression  that  resembles  self-creative
activities more than those which concern the inquiry into the physical world” (ibid.:
92). Of course, anything that depends on human subjectivity is not guaranteed by an
“objective authority” and is simply human, that is, contingent: “Renouncing the idea of
an intrinsic, universal and predetermined human nature, he [Rorty] affirms that each
person is  a  web of  beliefs,  behaviors  and desires  that  are  the  result  of  a  series  of
contingent  factors,  such  as  family  and  school  education,  cultural  tradition  and
linguistic forms.” (Ibid.: 93).
15 I  take  it  that  Calcaterra’s  ultimate  ambition  is  to  draw on  Rorty  to  outline  a  new
pragmatist anthropology, as she says in Chapter 6, the last in the book. She restates
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that this cannot be done without referring to Dewey’s conception of experience nor
Rorty’s conception of the contingent character of normativity as implied in linguistic
practices.  But  these  practices  should  not  be  “conceived  as  a  key  factor  in  the
interactions with the physical-natural and social environment within which the vital
needs of human beings take place and, as a consequence,” but rather as the “tool of
tools” (ibid.:  112). She suggests that neither the classical pragmatist theory of habits
and the neopragmatist theory of norms – or the Deweyan conception of experience and
the  Rortyan  conception  of  language  –  are  incompatible  (ibid.:  120).  This  seems
promising,  but  we  should  go  further  by  reconstructing  Dewey’s  understanding  of
language (Dreon 2014) and Rorty’s understanding of experience (Timm 2019).
 
6. Conclusion
16 Calcaterra’s philosophy can be labelled “integrative” given its balanced efforts to avoid
sharp  contrasts  between  the  analytic  school  and  pragmatism,  and  old  and  new
pragmatisms. It is a philosophy aimed at integrating science and the arts, language and
experience, descriptive and normative, irony and solidarity, emotion and reason, ethics
and aesthetics,  logic  and  behaviour,  contingency  and  normativity,  and  so  on.  The
strategy is to “transcend” any kind of dualism. Thanks to this Calcaterra ranks among
distinguished contemporary European pragmatists. In particular she has become one of
the  most  respected  international  Rortyan  scholars.  She  advocates  a  non-reductive
naturalism, one of the most promising conceptions of a new pragmatist anthropology,
which is urgently needed in the current era of humanity in crisis.
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NOTES
1. What I would particularly like to see republished in a single volume are Rorty’s interviews and
book reviews, or at least a substantial  selection of them. This could be done in a reasonable
period of time, whereas the critical edition of Collected Works of Richard Rorty, if there is such a
project, probably awaits another generation of scholars.
2. A small local conference commemorating Rorty’s posthumous 80th birthday was held by the
Slovak Philosophical Association in Bratislava (see Višňovský & Gál 2011). 
3. See [https://richardrortysociety.org]. So far two international conferences have been held by
the RSS, in 2016 and 2019.
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4. Of these I would like to list Gascoigne (2008), Kuipers (2013), Gröschner, Koopman & Sandbothe
(2013), Schulenberg (2015) and Malachowski (2020). Višňovský (2015) has similar intentions.
5. Her understanding of “analytic philosophy” extends very broadly to all “post-Wittgensteinian
philosophies” (see Calcaterra 2011). 
6. Rorty’s attitude towards analytic philosophy was for the most part critical and dismissive. 
7. For the difference between the pragmatist (and Rortyan) linguistic turn and other linguistic
turns see Sandbothe (2004).
8. I outlined the distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic practices in Višňovský (2018).
9. It would require, to my mind, the integration of Dewey’s and Rorty’s conceptions of human
social practices. Robert Brandom has travelled farthest in this direction, but he is still immersed
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